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LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS FACING NONIMMIGRANTS
ENTERING LICENSED PROFESSIONS
By Justin Storch1

In 2005, Karen LeClerc, Guillame Jarry,
Beatrice Boulord, Maureen Affleck, Caroline Wallace,
and Emily Maw sought admission to the Louisiana
Bar.2 Emily Maw, a graduate of Tulane University
Law School, and the others, who were graduates
of law schools outside the United States, were all in
the United States legally on J-1 or H-1B visas.3 J-1
visas allow participants in exchange-visitor programs
to travel to the United States, whereas H-1B visas
provide opportunities for foreign workers in specialty
occupations to work in the United States.
Despite their good academic standing, and
the fact that Emily Maw possessed a U.S. law degree,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in LeClerc v. Webb upheld a Louisiana Supreme
Court rule prohibiting these foreign born individuals
from taking the Louisiana Bar due to their lack of
legal permanent resident (LPR) status.4 LPR status is
given to immigrants with the right to reside in the U.S.
permanently. In denying non-LPRs from taking the
bar examination, the State of Louisiana denied them
an opportunity to practice law in the state, denied
Louisiana employers an opportunity to hire them
(as well as other U.S. employers who need attorneys
barred in Louisiana), and denied U.S. citizens in need
of legal services from utilizing and benefitting from
their legal skills and knowledge.
Had any of these individuals been LPRs,
they would have been allowed to take the Louisiana
bar exam. The rule regarding LPRs and licensure
exams finds its origins in In Re Griffiths, where in
1973 the Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut
law that prohibited non-U.S. citizens from taking
the Connecticut bar exam.5 Since then, states have
not been able to discriminate against LPRs seeking
licensure in their respective professions.
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If states cannot deny LPRs an opportunity
to take the tests required for licensure, why were the
plaintiffs in LeClerc denied the same opportunity?
Despite the ruling in Griffiths, some states, such
as Louisiana, have continued to limit licensing
procedures and also deny licensure to certain classes
of immigrants. These states draw a distinction
between LPRs and those foreign nationals “admitted
temporarily and for a specific purpose,” referred to as
nonimmigrants.6 But courts have differed on whether
to permit such a distinction. While the LeClerc court
upheld the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision,
barring nonimmigrants from taking licensing exams,
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York invalidated a similarly
restrictive law in Adusumelli v. Steiner.7 In Adusumelli,
a New York education law limited U.S. citizens and
LPRs to be licensed as pharmacists, leading a group
of 26 nonimmigrant plaintiffs to file suit.8 The court
overturned the law and allowed the nonimmigrant
plaintiffs to take the licensing exams.9
The Adusumellli court provides a model that
other courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, should
follow. Courts should not use the distinction between
LPRs and nonimmigrants to deny foreign nationals
the opportunity to enter licensed professions in the
U.S. Nonimmigrants with the necessary skills and
knowledge to successfully enter professions such as
law, medicine, and engineering should be encouraged
to enter the U.S. market without unnecessary and
irrational barriers.
This article argues that federal immigration
law preempts state laws that prohibit nonimmigrants
from taking state licensing exams. These state
laws occupy the field of immigrant employment
authorization, which is the domain of the federal
government. In doing so, they stand as an obstacle to
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the federal government’s decision regarding a foreign
national’s admission into the U.S., placing conditions
upon U.S. residency that are absent from federal law.
Furthermore, under an equal protection analysis,
there is no significant distinction between immigrants
and nonimmigrants, and therefore, all classifications
based on alienage should be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.
Part I of this article describes the distinction
between immigrants and nonimmigrants, explaining
the reasoning and distinctions that states have used to
justify the denial of licensure to nonimmigrants. Parts
II and III discuss the legal issues regarding professional
licensing for immigrants and nonimmigrants,
respectively. Parts II and II also include a discussion
of the Griffiths, LeClerc and Adusumelli decisions
and their impact on federal immigration law. Part
IV outlines the policy implications of a distinction
between immigrants and nonimmigrants in state
licensing procedures. Specifically, Part IV discusses
the harm done to nonimmigrants, U.S. employers,
and the U.S. as a whole, when laws, regulations, and
court decisions deny nonimmigrants the opportunity
to enter licensed professions. Part V is a legal
analysis of the distinction between immigrants and
nonimmigrants. This section applies legal tests to
examine how federal law preempts restrictive state
licensure laws, and argues for similar preemption
during an equal protection analysis. Part VI concludes
the article, and argues for the elimination of state
licensure laws that prohibit nonimmigrants from
obtaining licensure.
I. DISTINCTION BETWEEN IMMIGRANTS
AND NONIMMIGRANTS
The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) groups foreign nationals seeking to enter the
U.S. into two broad categories: nonimmigrants and
immigrants. Nonimmigrants are foreign nationals
that are “admitted temporarily and for a specific
purpose.”10 Several categories of foreign nationals
fall into the broader category of nonimmigrants,
including temporary workers, students, foreign
diplomats, tourists, and business travelers.11 The
complete list of nonimmigrant visa classifications is
set forth in the subsections of Section 101(a)(15) of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA).12
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Nonimmigrants are restricted both on the
amount of time they can be present in the United
States, and the activities in which they can participate.13
For instance, a nonimmigrant admitted on a student
visa does not have unfettered work authorization, as
the individual is limited to the practical training that
relates to the nonimmigrant’s student visa. Moreover,
a nonimmigrant admitted as a temporary worker does
not have authorization to attend a university.
Generally, nonimmigrants must express their
intent to stay in the U.S. only for a short period of
time. However, the U.S. Department of State (State
Department) has recognized a doctrine of “dual
intent” for certain classes of nonimmigrants.14 After
the Immigration Act of 1990, the State Department
concluded that Congress should eliminate
nonimmigrant intent as a factor in adjudicating
applications for H-1 visas, which are used by
temporary workers in specialty occupations, and L
visas, which are used by intra-company transferees.15
Thus, an applicant in either visa category can come to
the U.S. in nonimmigrant status, while simultaneously
pursuing permanent residence status.
The INA defines “immigrants” as “every alien
except an alien who is within one of the . . . classes
of nonimmigrant aliens” listed in Section 101(a)(15).16
Under Section 214(b) of the INA, immigration officials
must presume that all foreign nationals entering the
U.S. intend to immigrate to the U.S. permanently. But
this intention is not presumed for those entering the
U.S. in the L, V, and H-1 visa categories.17 Thus, all
foreign nationals entering the U.S. as legal permanent
residents (LPRs) are immigrants.
II. LICENSING AND IMMIGRANTS (LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENTS)
In the 1886 landmark case of Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court allowed Chinese
immigrants to bring an equal protection challenge
against a San Francisco laundry ordinance, which was
being discriminately enforced against them.18 The
14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits
states from denying equal protection under U.S. law
to persons within the several states.19 In Yick Wo, the
Court established that lawfully present resident aliens
were considered “persons” within the meaning of the
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.20
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In Graham v. Richardson, in determining
whether the states of Arizona and Pennsylvania could
deny government assistance to resident aliens, the
Court went a step further than the Yick Wo Court. It
declared, “classifications based on alienage, like those
based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect
and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”21 In Graham, the
states posited that they had a “special public interest”
in distribution of government resources toward its
own citizens.22 The Court rejected this argument,
noting that resident aliens also pay taxes, and that “[t]
here can be no ‘special public interest’ in tax revenues
to which aliens have contributed on an equal basis
with the residents of the State.”23
In 1973, the Court in In re Griffiths
specifically addressed the question of state licensing
laws for LPRs. In Griffiths, an LPR with citizenship
in the Netherlands satisfied all the qualifications for
admission to the Connecticut bar, except for the
requirement that an applicant had to be a U.S. citizen
to be admitted to the bar.24 The Court again applied
strict judicial scrutiny, and emphasized that because
resident aliens pay taxes, may serve in the Armed
Forces, and contribute to society in a variety of ways,
they should not be denied the opportunity to become
licensed professionals.25 Thus, the Court placed a
heavy burden on states in justifying the denial of
employment opportunities based on alienage.26
The Griffiths Court noted that states have a
legitimate interest in ensuring that those admitted
to the bar meet “the character and general fitness
requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.”27
However, the Court found that the character and
general fitness requirements were not used by the
state of Connecticut to exclude bar membership
for foreign nationals.28 Instead, the state justified the
exclusion by noting that foreign nationals may have a
divided allegiance to the U.S. that would impede their
ability to carry out certain duties, such as signing writs
and subpoenas, and administering oaths.29
The Court found the state’s “divided
allegiance” argument unconvincing. The decision
noted that these duties “hardly involve matters of
state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as
to entrust them only to citizens.”30 Furthermore, the
Court opined that although some resident aliens may
be unsuited for the bar, it does not justify a wholesale
exclusion of resident aliens.31 In the Court’s opinion,
the continued scrutiny attorneys face once admitted
14

to the bar, such as sanctions and disbarment, would
reduce unethical behavior in resident alien attorneys.32
The Court has applied the same reasoning
from Griffiths in other cases, prohibiting states from
limiting access to professions based on alienage. In
Sugarman v. Dougall, the Court struck down a New
York state law that limited the appointment of
competitive civil service jobs to U.S. citizens, and
excluded aliens.33 Likewise, in Examining Board of
Engineers v. Flores de Otero, the Court struck down a
Puerto Rican law that limited the granting of civil
engineering private practice licenses to U.S. citizens.34
The Court has delineated two exceptions to
the general rule that states cannot deny employment
opportunities based on alienage. First, the Court has
recognized that states can have a legitimate interest
in limiting the access to employment that serves a
political and governmental function to U.S. Citizens.35
For instance, in Foley v. Connelie, the Court upheld a
New York state law that permitted only U.S citizens
to be employed by the state police force.36 Second, a
state may deny employment opportunities to those
who are not lawfully present in the U.S.37 For example,
in DeCanas v. Bica, the Court upheld a California
law imposing criminal sanctions on employers
who knowingly employ immigrants without work
authorization, which result in fewer employers willing
to hire undocumented workers.38
III. LICENSING AND NONIMMIGRANTS
While the Supreme Court has struck
down laws that prohibit non-citizens from entering
licensed professions, it has never directly addressed
the issue of whether states may distinguish between
immigrants and nonimmigrants in their licensure
procedures. However, lower courts have addressed
the issue and have reached varied conclusions.
In LeClerc, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit considered a Louisiana Supreme Court
rule that restricted the admission of U.S. citizens and
resident aliens to the Louisiana bar.39 The Louisiana
Supreme Court in In Re Bourke, interpreted the phrase
“resident alien” to include “only . . . those aliens who
have attained permanent resident status in the United
States.”40 Challenging this decision, the plaintiffs in
LeClerc claimed that the Court in Griffiths, in applying
strict judicial scrutiny to a law affecting LPRs,
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supported the proposition that all immigrants were a
suspect class (a class for which all laws discriminating
against the class are inherently suspect) and, therefore,
the Louisiana rule is subject to strict scrutiny.41 This
line of reason follows from the Graham court’s
reasoning that it is inherently suspect for a law to uses
classifications based on alienage and, therefore, such
laws should be subject to strict scrutiny.42
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the plaintiffs,
stating that nonimmigrants “are not a suspect class
under Griffiths.”43 The court noted a “paramount”
distinction between the plaintiffs in LeClerc and the
plaintiffs in Griffiths, as the former was a group of
nonimmigrants and the latter was a group of LPRs.44
The court noted that nonimmigrants “ordinarily
stipulate before entry to this country that they have
no intention of abandoning their native citizenship.”45
In the eyes of the court, nonimmigrants are not
“similarly situated” to U.S. citizens in the way that
permanent residents are because of their temporary
connection to the U.S. Because of this temporary
and dissimilar connection, nonimmigrants are not
entitled to strict judicial scrutiny.46 The court upheld
the Louisiana rule applying rational basis review.47
The Adusumelli court reached a different
conclusion.48 In Adusumelli v. Steiner, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York
considered a New York education law that limited the
ability of U.S. citizens and permanent residents to be
licensed as pharmacists.49 The twenty-six plaintiffs in
Adusumelli were nonimmigrant pharmacists residing
in the U.S., either with H-1B visas or “TN” temporary
worker status (a status created by the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for citizens of
Canada and Mexico).50
The Adusumelli court found that the state
law interfered with federal immigration power
reserved for Congress in the U.S. Constitution
through the Naturalization Clause, which gives
Congress the power to “establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization”, and the Supremacy Clause, which
states that the Constitution and other federal laws
will be the supreme law of the land.51 The state
argued that Congress explicitly gave states discretion
in this field through 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(v)(A),
which states that “[i]f an occupation requires a state
or local license for an individual to fully perform
the duties of the occupation, an alien . . . seeking [a
temporary work visa] in that occupation must have
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that license prior to approval of the petition.”52 The
court, however, concluded that this merely outlines a
division of labor, finding that the federal government
determines admissibility, while the state determines
professional competence.53
The State of New York, referencing LeClerc,
noted that legal permanent residents pay taxes,
can serve in the military, and can work in the U.S.
indefinitely, whereas other foreign nationals have
less in common with U.S. citizens.54 The state argued
that the plaintiffs, therefore, were not entitled to
strict scrutiny in an equal protection analysis.55 The
court noted, however, that nonimmigrants are largely
subject to the same tax rules as U.S. citizens, at least
in regards to their U.S. income.56
Additionally, the Adusumelli court referenced
the doctrine of dual intent.57 This doctrine allows
holders of certain classes of visas to pursue
permanent residence while residing in the U.S. as a
nonimmigrant. Regarding this doctrine, the court
noted that nonimmigrants are not as transient as
other courts have characterized them to be, and that
many nonimmigrants are in the process of applying
for green cards.58 The Supreme Court’s decision
in Nyquist v. Mauclet, played a pivotal role in the
Adusumelli court’s reasoning regarding the somewhat
transient nature of nonimmigrants.59 In Nyquist, the
Supreme Court considered a New York law that
denied financial assistance for higher education to
those who had not applied for citizenship, or did not
intend to do so once eligible.60 The Supreme Court
applied strict scrutiny in invalidating the law, and
rejected the practice of discriminating against foreign
nationals on the basis of transience.61
Furthermore, the Adusumelli decision noted
that nonimmigrants are no less likely to be the victim of
irrational discrimination than their LPR counterparts;
in fact, they are more likely to be discriminated
against.62 The court noted that when a group is subject
to such irrational discrimination, courts usually apply
at least heightened, or intermediate, scrutiny.63 The
court found that denial of an opportunity to obtain
a pharmacist’s license triggers at least intermediate
scrutiny, and that is was unnecessary to determine
whether to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny
because the law would fail at either level.64 The court
found that the state was unable to show that there
were “important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed [were] substantially
15

related to the achievement of those objectives,” as
required in intermediate scrutiny cases.65
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
IMMIGRANT/NONIMMIGRANT
LICENSING DISTINCTION
Restrictive state licensure laws deny
opportunities to highly educated and qualified foreign
workers, who not only benefit the U.S. workforce,
but also the nation as a whole. Congress did not
create multiple categories of nonimmigrant work
visas haphazardly. For instance, with the H-1B visa,
Congress intentionally promoted the inclusion of
highly educated and qualified foreign nationals into
the U.S. workforce. The H-1B classification is a visa
category that allows foreign nationals who work in
“specialty occupations” to seek employment in the
U.S.66 The law defines a “specialty occupation” as one
that requires a “theoretical and practical application
of a body of highly specialized knowledge,” and a
bachelor’s degree or its equivalent.67 While full-state
licensure is required to practice in a specific state,
the law does not permit states to create separate
requirements or deny licenses based on alienage.68
In determining whether foreign nationals
should be able to work in the U.S., either on a
temporary or permanent basis, Congress evaluated
the costs and benefits of immigration. Regarding
licensed professions, foreign nationals must meet the
same requirements of licensure as other U.S. citizens;
however, there is no indication that Congress intended
for foreign nationals to meet additional requirements.
Furthermore,
when
state
licensing
requirements for foreign nationals are not uniform,
the inconsistency creates uncertainty for foreign
nationals who wish to enter a licensed profession.
Numerous professions require licensure to practice
in multiple states, but because of the varied nature
of state licensure recruitments, a foreign national
admitted to practice in one state may be ineligible
in another. Likewise, a foreign national who wishes
to transfer jobs once in the U.S., could face barriers
that U.S. citizens and permanent residents do not
encounter. For instance, an attorney with an H-1B
visa practicing law in New York would not be able to
transfer to a job in Louisiana, regardless if the attorney
had the knowledge and skill necessary to pass the
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Louisiana bar. Essentially, these requirements reduce
the freedom of nonimmigrants, and discourage
foreign nationals from accepting new employment or
changing jobs.
Proponents of restrictive licensure laws
contend that licensed professionals who are non-U.S.
citizens, or are LPRs, are more likely to be transient,
and are likely to leave their job after a relatively short
period of time and return to their native country.
To mitigate these concerns regarding transience,
U.S. immigration policy should encourage licensed
professionals to remain in the U.S. With dual intent
visas, such as H-1B and L-1 visas, even nonimmigrants
have a way to become citizens, which reduces the risk
of transience. While some professionals may come
to the U.S. without the intent to remain permanently,
immigration policy should balance the risk of
transience against the benefits these foreign nationals
could provide during their temporary employment.
These benefits, although temporary, greatly outweigh
the negative effects of transience.
Domestic employers benefit tremendously
from their ability to hire the best professionals from
around the world. Likewise, the nation as a whole
benefits from being able to obtain high quality
professional services, and arbitrary obstacles based
on the nationality and immigration status only
hinders this ability. Thus, states should not only
permit foreign nationals to apply for such licensure,
they should encourage it.
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMMIGRANT/
NONIMMIGRANT DISTINCTION
A. Federal immigration law supersedes state laws
that prohibit nonimmigrants from entering licensed
professions
As the Adusumelli court noted, the federal
government has sole power to implement U.S.
immigration policy. As previously stated, this power
comes from the U.S. Constitution through the
Naturalization Clause, and the Supremacy Clause.69
Various courts have used the DeCanas tests, which
is described below, to determine whether federal
law preempts a state law that affects immigration.
Although the Adusumelli court referred to the DeCanas
case and tests, and reached a conclusion in harmony
with the tests, it did so without explicitly applying
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them. This section will analyze and apply the DeCanas
tests to the immigrant/nonimmigrant distinction.
DeCanas Tests
In League of United Latin American Citizens
v. Wilson (LULAC), the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California reviewed a voterapproved initiative. The initiative gave state officials
the authority to verify the immigration status of
people with whom they come in contact, and deny
health care, education, and other benefits based
on their determination.70 In determining whether
the initiative at issue in LULAC was preempted by
federal law, the District Court looked to the Supreme
Court case of DeCanas v. Bica.71 In DeCanas, migrant
farm workers in California challenged a state law
that placed criminal sanctions upon employers who
knowingly employed undocumented immigrants, if
such employment adversely affected lawful resident
workers.72
The Court in DeCanas proffered three tests
to assist in their analysis of the state law. The first
DeCanas test requires a court to determine whether
the state action is a “regulation of immigration.”73 The
DeCanas Court defines “regulation of immigration”
as “essentially a determination of who should or
should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”74
However, not all state regulations that affect
immigrants are “regulations of immigration.”75 For
example, in DeCanas, the Court dealt with a California
law that imposed criminal sanctions on employers
who knowingly hired immigrants without legal work
authorization. This was found to be a regulation
of employment, not a pre-empted “regulation of
immigration.”76
The second DeCanas test, requires a court to
determine whether “Congress intended to ‘occupy the
field’ which the statute attempts to regulate.”77 Even
if the state law is not a “regulation of immigration,”
it may nevertheless be preempted if it occupies a field
Congress has claimed for itself.78 The DeCanas Court
concluded that, for a state law to be preempted, the
“clear and manifest purpose” of Congress must
be “complete ouster of state power including state
power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal
laws.”79
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The third DeCanas test requires the court to
determine if a state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”80 This test was fashioned
by the Supreme Court in Hines v. Davidowitz.81 In Hines,
the Court examined a Pennsylvania law that set up a
state level immigrant registration scheme, which had
registration, information disclosure, and identification
requirements for aliens beyond what was required
by federal law.82 The Court decided that federal law
preempted the Pennsylvania law because the federal
government had exercised its constitutional authority
to implement the standards for alien registration and
states could not add to these requirements.83
1. State licensure laws survive the first
DeCanas test, because they are not
regulations of immigration.
As noted above, a “regulation of
immigration” is “essentially a determination of who
should or should not be admitted into the country,
and the conditions under which a legal entrant
may remain.”84 However, if the state law primarily
affects another field other than immigration, it is
not considered a regulation of immigration.85 This
was the case in DeCanas, where the state sanctioned
employers rather than determining the admission
status of the immigrant, or altering the conditions
under which an immigrant may remain in the
U.S.86 The Court described the California law as
having a “purely speculative and indirect impact on
immigration.”87 In contrast, the LULAC court stated
that to require a state official to question arrestees,
applicants for state welfare benefits, students, and
parents of students regarding their immigration
status, was a regulation of immigration.88 The court
found that the primary purpose of the initiative was
to place limitations on foreign nationals, and that
federal law explicitly allows these individuals to enter
and remain in the U.S. Accordingly, the court held
that federal law preempted the state initiative.
State licensure laws that limit licensure to U.S.
citizens and LPRs more closely resemble the state law
at issue in DeCanas, rather than the initiative at issue
in LULAC. Like DeCanas, state licensure laws do not
specifically place conditions on who may remain in
the U.S., rather these laws place regulations only on
employment. The aim of state licensing bodies is to
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ensure that those who receive professional licenses
meet the profession’s minimum qualifications and
standards. Because this is a permissible state function,
the fact that immigration status is a factor that a
licensing body may find relevant, nevertheless does
not make it a regulation of immigration.
One might argue that like the initiative
in LULAC, prohibitive state licensing laws place
conditions on those who may remain in the U.S. and,
thus, fail the first DeCanas test. However, the aim of
the state licensing bodies is not to determine who
may or may not enter or remain in the country. The
licensing bodies’ only concern is with the standards
for admission into the various professions. Thus,
while an argument comparing state licensing laws
to LULAC is interesting, it is likely not compelling
enough to invalidate these state licensure laws.
2. Prohibitive state licensure laws fail
the second DeCanas test, as Congress
intended to occupy the field of
immigrant admissions.
The second DeCanas test notes that federal
law preempts state or local law, regardless of whether
it is a “regulation of immigration,” if Congress
intended to “occupy the field” that the state law seeks
to regulate.89 Under this test, federal law preempts
state law only if Congress’s clear and manifest
purpose is a complete ouster of state regulatory
power within the field.90
In DeCanas, the Court noted that states have
“broad authority under their police powers to regulate
the employment relationship to protect workers
within the State.”91 Therefore, the state in DeCanas had
the power to ensure that California employers would
not employ those individuals not lawfully authorized
to work in the U.S.92 The Court found no compelling
evidence that Congress, through the INA, intended
to oust state powers to regulate employment to
ensure a lawful workforce.93 Therefore, the California
law survived the second DeCanas test.94
State licensure laws are distinguishable from
DeCanas in this regard. State licensing bodies have the
authority to determine the standards for admission
to a profession. This is a different type of authority
than the police power at issue in DeCanas. The state in
DeCanas merely determined whether employees met
federal standards for lawful employment, whereas
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state licensure boards create standards for admission
at the state level to various professions.
It is evident that the federal government
sought to occupy the field of immigrant admissions.
The federal government determines what the
standards and requirements are for admission to the
U.S. through a nonimmigrant visa, and adjudicates
individuals on a case-by-case basis. For instance,
with H-1B visas, Congress has determined the
qualifications necessary to work in the U.S. in a
specialty occupation.95 While state licensure is
required prior to issuance of a visa, the Adusumelli
court correctly noted a division of labor.96 The federal
government retains its domain over determinations
of admissibility, and the state government determines
professional competence.97
3. Prohibitive state licensure rules violate
the third DeCanas test as they stand
as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.
Under the third DeCanas test, federal
immigration law preempts state and local regulations
when they are found to be obstacles to “the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”98 The LULAC court
stated this test somewhat differently, noting there is
preemption if state laws conflict with federal law, and
compliance with both is impossible.99 The Court in
Hines v. Davidowitz utilized this compliance test.
In Hines, the Court struck down annual
registration and state identification requirements,
because the federal government has its own uniform
registration and identification requirements.100
Similarly, the classification, notification, and
cooperation/reporting provisions of the initiative
at issue in LULAC, violated the third DeCanas test,
because they conflicted with federal deportation
laws.101 Furthermore, federal law preempted
provisions of the LULAC initiative that denied state
benefits to immigrants when state officials reasonably
suspected that an immigrant was not lawfully present.
The Court held that the initiative was preempted
because a state official’s “reasonable suspicion” is not
the same as verification under federal law.102
Similarly, prohibitive state licensure laws
directly conflict with federal immigration policy,
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and are in violation of the third DeCanas test. The
federal government determines whether foreign
nationals meet the requirements to work in the U.S.
through nonimmigrant work visas. This includes
a determination of whether these individuals
are qualified to practice in the specific specialty
occupation. And generally, one of the requirements
for foreign nationals to obtain employment is to
first become licensed by the state in their particular
field. Thus, a foreign national must be able to
take bar exams, medical licensing exams, etc. to
determine admissibility. When a state determines
that nonimmigrants are ineligible to take such an
exam, the state stands as an obstacle to the federal
government’s determination of admissibility.
B. There is no significant distinction between
immigrants and nonimmigrants for purposes of
equal protection analysis and strict scrutiny should
also apply to laws affecting nonimmigrants.
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Yick
Wo determined that legally present resident aliens are
“persons” for the purpose of an equal protection
analysis.103 Furthermore, classifications based on
alienage are subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and the
Court will apply this strict scrutiny to laws affecting
LPRs.104
Despite the Supreme Court’s application of
strict scrutiny to alienage classifications, during an
equal protection analysis the LeClerc court drew a
distinction between immigrants and nonimmigrants.105
The Adusumelli court disagreed with the LeClerc court,
noting that nonimmigrants are generally subject to the
same federal income tax rules as their LPR and U.S.
citizen counterparts.106 Furthermore, the doctrine
of dual intent allows certain nonimmigrants to seek
permanent residence in the U.S., while residing in the
U.S. on temporary visas.107
The Adusumelli court’s analysis is correct
and the most viable. However, the court did not
reach a holding as to whether strict scrutiny or
intermediate scrutiny should apply to laws affecting
nonimmigrants. The court found the determination
of the level of judicial scrutiny pointless, because
the licensing law under either standard would fail.108
Despite the Court’s decision to forgo such a holding,
its analysis strongly suggests that laws affecting
nonimmigrants should be subject to strict scrutiny.
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The Adusumelli court noted that the Supreme
Court in Nyquist applied strict scrutiny to a law affecting
foreign nationals who had not, and did not intend to
apply for permanent residency.109 Therefore, it logically
follows from Nyquist that strict scrutiny should apply
to licensing laws preventing nonimmigrants from
entering licensed professions. Furthermore, the Graham
Court’s reason for determining that classifications
based on alienage are subject to strict scrutiny was that
such a classification was inherently suspect, and that
immigrants are a “discrete and insular minority.”110
Classifications that affect nonimmigrants are no less
inherently suspect than classifications that affect LPRs,
and nonimmigrants are certainly a discrete and insular
minority.
Should the Supreme Court consider a case
regarding licensing of nonimmigrants, the Court
should clarify that its application of strict scrutiny
to classifications based on alienage covers all foreign
nationals, regardless of whether they are immigrants
or nonimmigrants.
VI. CONCLUSION
The state licensing process for professionals
should be open to U.S. citizens, immigrants, and
nonimmigrants alike. Federal immigration power
preempts states laws that prohibit nonimmigrants
from entering professions such as law, medicine
and engineering. Moreover, Congress has occupied
the field of immigrant admissions, and, thus, these
state licensing laws stand as an obstacle to federal
determination of admissibility. Furthermore, such
laws should be subject to strict scrutiny because there
is no significant distinction between immigrants and
nonimmigrants in an equal protection analysis.
Nonimmigrants who face the barriers such as
ones faced by the plaintiffs in LeClerc, who are merely
coming to the U.S. to better their lives by entering
licensed professions, have a tough and precarious
predicament, and deserve relief. The denial of an
opportunity to enter their professions not only hurts
the individuals, but U.S. employers, and citizens
who would benefit from their work. Congress and
state legislatures should eliminate prohibitive state
licensure laws and regulations, such as the Louisiana
bar rule. And if necessary, the courts should act and
strike them down. If nonimmigrants can take the
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licensing exams required for their field in all states, an
impediment will disappear, uncertainty will dissipate,
and highly educated and qualified workers will be
encouraged to bring their skills to the U.S.
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